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DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
AFTER OLIN AND UNITED TECHNOLOGIES:




Labor arbitration traditionally has been praised as a dispute resolution
procedure. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act (LMRA) declares arbitration to be the "desirable method" for settlement
of disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements.' In 1957 the
Supreme Court gave its first official recognition to the preferred status of
labor arbitration in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,2 holding that
federal courts must grant specific performance of collective bargaining
agreements to arbitrate disputes. Three years later, in a group of cases
collectively known as the Steelworkers' Trilogy, 3 the Supreme Court empha-
sized that arbitration plays a vital role in the maintenance of industrial peace
in the United States.4 To promote arbitration and its goal of maintaining
industrial peace, the Court declared that arbitration agreements would be
broadly construeds and given "full play."16 The Court's willingness to defer
is based largely upon the belief that arbitrators are highly qualified to resolve
controversies arising from interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
7
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1. Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter cited as LMRA], § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1976). "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The service is directed to make its
conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance disputes only
as a last resort and in exceptional cases." Id.
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
4. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578.
5. Id. at 583. The Court stated: "Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude,
all of the question on which the parties disagree must therefore come within the scope of the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement." Id. at 581. Furthermore, the
court concluded that "[dloubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 583.
6. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566.
7. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
The Court observed that even the "ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience
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The Court noted that arbitrators are generally selected because of their
knowledge of the "common law of the shop," 8 as well as their ability to
consider factors not expressly articulated in the agreement. 9 The Court's
reliance on arbitrators to decide contractual disputes encouraged other courts
and judicial agencies to adopt the deferral policy and extend it to allow
arbitrators to decide statutory issues as well.
For over thirty years, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) has adhered to a policy requiring deferral to arbitration awards
whenever certain minimum procedural standards are met. The Board grad-
ually has expanded and refined its deferral policy over the years in an effort
to reconcile the maximum efficiency of the arbitration process with adequate
protection for employees' rights.' 0 Recently, however, the Board in Olin
Corp." and United Technologies2 significantly expanded the existing deferral
policy and effectively foreclosed individuals from vindicating their statutory
rights in the forums created by Congress. Now relegated to the arbitral
forum, individuals must depend upon a mechanism not designed for or adept
at adjudicating individuals' rights. In contrast, since 1974 the Supreme Court
has retreated from broad application of arbitral deferral. In three recent
cases the Court found that the federal labor policy favoring arbitration does
not justify deferral in cases where individual rights are at stake. The propriety
of the NLRB's expanded deferral policy must be seriously questioned in light
of the Supreme Court's trend of limiting arbitrators' jurisdiction to decide
"individual statutory rights" cases.
II. A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD'S DEFERRAL POLICIES
A. Post-Arbitral Deferral: Spielberg and its Pro-zeny
The National Labor Relations Board recognized the importance of ar-
bitration in achieving the objectives of federal labor policy 3 even before the
and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed." Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The arbitrator is able to consider the effect that a particular interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement might have upon productivity, morale or shop tension. Id.
10. See generally Moses, Deferral to Arbitration in Individual Rights Cases: A Re-
examination of Speilberg, 51 TENN. L.R. 187, 188 (1984). In establishing the content of the
NLRB's deferral policy, the Board must balance the tension between its duty to prevent unfair
labor practices and the desire to uphold the integrity of the arbitral process. See International
Harvestor Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d
784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
11. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
12. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
13. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). "It is declared
to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions
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Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitration in the Steelworkers' Trilogy."
To promote voluntary dispute resolution through arbitration, the Board began
to limit its own jursidiction and defer to arbitration awards. In 1955 the Board
articulated its first clear standard for deferral to arbitration awards in Spielberg
Manufacturing Co.' I The controversy in Spielberg centered on the union's
allegation that the company violated the anti-discimination policy of section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)" by refusing to reinstate
four strikers. The Board dismissed the complaint based upon an existing ar-
bitration award that upheld the discharges on grounds of strike misconduct."
The NLRB announced that it would continue to defer to existing arbitral awards
where three requirements were satisfied: (1) the arbitration proceedings ap-
pear to be fair and regular, (2) the parties to the contract have agreed to be
bound by the arbitral award, and (3) the decision of the arbitrator is not repug-
nant to the purposes and policies of the Act."I In Raytheon Co., ' the Board
added an important fourth requirement: the arbitrator must be presented with
and resolve the unfair labor practice issue.20 The goal of these standards for
deferral was to promote the voluntary resolution of labor disputes by a method
mutually agreed upon by the parties," without undermining the Board's
jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practice disputes and its duty to protect
public statutory rights set forth in the NLRA. "2 In addition, deferral would
to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for purposes of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection." Id.
14. See Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 161
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). Since 1946, the Board has deferred to arbitration awards in unfair
labor practice cases. Id. Not until 1955, however, did the Board formalize a deferral policy.
See Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); infra text accompanying notes 15-23
(discussing Spielberg).
15. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
16. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) (1976). Section 8(a)(3) provides in relevant
part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment on any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." Id.
17. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081.
18. Id. at 1082.
19. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), set aside on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
20. 140 N.L.R.B. at 884. Subsequent Board decisions refined the Raytheon requirement.
In Airco Industrial Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972), the Board held that it would not defer to
an arbitration award which gave no indication that the arbitrator ruled on the unfair labor
practice issue. In Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972), the Board placed the burden
of proving that the unfair labor practice issue had been addressed by the arbitrator upon the
party seeking deferral.
21. See LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976), supra note I.
22. See NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). "The Board is empowered, as
hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ...
19861
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prevent the expense and injustice which would result if the respondent were
required to defend himself in two separate forums on the same charge.
Encouraged by the Supreme Court's endorsement of labor arbitration
and judicial approval of Spielberg,23 the Board and reviewing courts contin-
ued to expand the Spielberg deferral doctrine. In International Harvestor
Co.,24 the Board reaffirmed its Spielberg position and announced that it
would defer to the arbitrator's decision unless "palpably wrong." 25 The
NLRB stated that it would "voluntarily withhold" its authority to adjudicate
statutory unfair labor claims arising out of arbitrated contractual claims
"unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings were tainted by
fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural irregularities or that the
award was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."2 6 With
this decision the Board significantly restricted the circumstances under which
it would review and reverse an arbitration award.
The Spielberg doctrine was expanded to its furthest extent in 1974 by
Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.27 There the Board announced that it
would defer to an arbitration award, and thus refuse to hear the unfair labor
practice charges, where the complainant failed to present to the arbitrator
available evidence concerning the unfair labor practices. 2 The Board held
that it woula presume that the arbitrator adequately determined all related
unfair labor practice claims 29 unless "unusual circumstances are shown which
demonstrate that there were bona fide reasons ... which caused the failure
to introduce such evidence at the arbitration proceeding." a0 In effect, this
policy eliminated the Raytheon requirement from the Spielberg deferral
standards," thereby giving arbitration awards much greater finality.
The Board's decision in Electronic Reproduction was based upon the
belief that the main function of the NLRB was to promote industrial peace
affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise ... ." Id.
23. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing Steelworkers' Trilogy).
24. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
25. Id. at 928-29.
26. Id. at 927.
27. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
28. Id. at 762.
29. Id. By presuming that the arbitrator had considered the statutory issues inherent in
the unfair labor practice claim, Electronic Reproduction directly overruled two earlier Board
decisions: Airco Industrial Gases and Yourga Trucking, Inc. Id. at 761. The Board in Electronic
Reproduction held that Airco and Yourga were "essentially incompatible with the underlying
policies of both Collyer and Spielberg" because they undermined the contractual dispute
resolution process "by encouraging ... a withholding of clearly relevant evidence." Id. Under
the presumption announced in Electronic Reproduction, the Board shifted the burden of proof
onto the party seeking to assert the unfair labor practice issue.
30. 213 N.L.R.B. at 762. "Bona fide reasons" which would justify a refusal to defer to
an arbitration award include instances where the arbitrator has specifically refused to rule on
certain issues because he considers them statutory as opposed to contractual issues, and where
the unfair labor practices occur after the arbitration award. Id.
31. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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by encouraging the fullest possible use of the collective bargaining and
arbitration processes.3 2 The Board was concerned that parties might deliber-
ately fail to introduce evidence of possible NLRA violations at the arbitration
proceeding in order to have a "second bite of the apple ' 33 in a subsequent
unfair labor practice proceeding.3 4 Such practices would undermine the
arbitration process by permitting inefficient dual litigation. 5 The dissent,
relying primarily upon the Supreme Court decision of Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 36 argued that the vindication of individuals' rights guaranteed
32. See LMRA § 203(d), supra note 1.
33. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761. The term "two bites of the apple" refers to dual or multiple
litigation. See Elwell and Feville, Arbitration Awards and Gardner-Denver Lawsuits: One Bite
or Two?, 23 INDus. REL. 287, 295 (1984) (concluding that Gardner-Denver affords aggrieved
workers a second bite at the apple if they are dissatisfied with arbitrator's decision).
34. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761-62. The majority in Electronic Reproduction likened the practice
of intentionally withholding evidence as "furthering the very multiple litigation which Spielberg
and Collyer were designed to discourage." Id. at 761.
In effect, Electronic Reproduction gave birth to a policy of estoppel in an attempt to force
parties to plead and prove all unfair labor practice claims in the initial arbitration proceeding.
See Filmation Assocs., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1977) (Members Penello and Walther, dissent-
ing). "Moreover, like the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel ... Spielberg is
intended to promote economy of legislation. A party having had the opportunity fairly to
litigate an issue in one forum and lost ought not be permitted to try the same issue in another
forum." Id. at 1473 (citations omitted).
35. Although dual litigation is inefficient, the issue is whether Congress intended to
provide individuals with a separate forum in which they can pursue and protect their statutory
rights granted by the NLRA. Some commentators maintain that the argument against dual
litigation has been severely deflated in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. (discussed at notes 128-139 infra). See Siber, The Gardner-Denver Decision:
Does it Put Arbitration in a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708, 717 (1974).
36. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
that in Title VII discrimination cases, a court may not properly defer to an arbitrator's
determination of the discrimination issue. The rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gardner-Denver was primarily founded upon a recognized dichotomy between private contrac-
tual and public statutory rights. While noting that a union may waive collective rights (such as
the right to strike) during collective bargaining in order to obtain benefits for its members, the
Court made it plain that a union could not waive an employee's individual statutory rights. Id.
at 51. The Court held that the rights guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are
individual statutory rights. Id. at 52. The Court supported the dichotomy by describing the
limited role of the arbitrator, by observing that the arbitral process is not suited to resolving
rights under Title VII, and by questioning the suitability of the informal fact-finding procedures
of arbitration to vindicate Title VII rights. Id. at 53-54 ("the arbitrator has authority to resolve
only questions of contractual rights ... ."); id. at 57 (because arbitrator's specialized compe-
tence is in "the law of the shop, not the law of the land," Court determined that resolution of
statutory issues is responsibility of courts and not of arbitrators.); id. at 57-58 (discussion of
informal fact-finding procedures).
The Electronic Reproduction dissent, Members Fanning and Jenkins, argued that the
reasoning of Gardner-Denver was equally applicable to the NLRA and Electronic Reproduction
because both cases involved a nearly identical issue-whether deferral to an arbitration award
would be permitted when a complaint involved a statutory violation of an employee's rights.
Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. at 766. The Board majority in Electronic
Reproduction found that Gardner-Denver was limited to the Title VII area because different
1986]
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by the NLRA should be the NLRB's primary concern and should take
precedence over the Board's concern that arbitration be maintained as a
quick and efficient means of settling labor disputes.
37
The Electronic Reproduction rule was not well received.18 In Stephenson
v. NLRB, 39 the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the rule because the Board
would defer to arbitration upon the "mere presumption in total absence of
any evidence" that the unfair labor practice had ever been resolved.4 The
Ninth Circuit held that deferral is appropriate only where the arbitration
panel is competent to resolve the issues subject to deferral and only when
those issues are clearly decided.4 1 Despite the Stephenson decision, 42 the
Board declined to overrule Electronic Reproduction until the 1980 decision
of Suburban Motor Freight.4 3 This case returned the NLRB to the standard
of deferral set by Raytheon." According to Suburban Motor Freight, the
Board "will give no deferrence to an arbitration award which bears no
indication that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue" involved in the
legislative histories and procedures of the acts precluded application of its holding to the NLRA.
Id. at 763-64. See notes 128-139 infra and accompanying text (further discussion of deferral to
arbitration in context of statutory violations of employee rights).
37. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765. Reconciling the competing Congressional policies of NLRA §
203(d) has been the major stumbling block in establishing a workable deferral policy. Collyer
Insulated Wire Co., 192 NLRB 837, 841 (1971); see also Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer
by NLRB of Section 8(a)(3) Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 201, 202 (problem of competing policies
resulted from failure of Congress "to explain what impact, if any, LMRA Section 203(d) would
have on the Board's exclusive authority to administer the NLRA pursuant to Section 10(a) of
the Act.") Section 10(a) of the NLRA empowers the Board to protect the individual statutory
rights of employees and commands that "[t]his power shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment .. " 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). This policy requires open access to Board
processes. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974). See also NLRB
v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968) (stating that "the overriding
public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy alternative .... ). On
the other hand, NLRA § 203(d) states the Congressional preference for private dispute resolution,
supports a broad deferral policy, and obviously limits access to the Board. See supra note 1.
38. See Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by NLRB of Section 8(a)(3) Cases, 27 LAB. L.J.
201, 211 (1976); Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J.
57, 74 (1973); but cf. Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes Under Section 8(a)(5),
50 TEX. L.R. 225, 263-265 (1972) (approving of Collyer and arguing that Collyer deferral policy
should be extended to cases in which no relevant arbitration clause exists).
39. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
40. Id. at 541.
41. Id. at 538. The requirements that the arbitrator be competent to resolve the issues in
question and that the arbitrator actually decide those issues were borrowed from Banyard v.
NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). These requirements are applied in addition to. the
Spielberg requirements and essentially form a five-pronged test. Stephenson, 550 F.2d at 537-538.
42. The Board paid little attention to Stephenson. When the Board finally overruled
Electronic Reproduction, Stephenson was mentioned only in a footnote reference as part of the
overall criticism of Electronic Reproduction. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146
n.5 (1980).
43. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
44. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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unfair labor practice charge.45 Additionally, the Board imposed "on the
party seeking Board deferral to an arbitration award the burden to prove
that the issue of discrimination was litigated before the arbitrator.' '46
The majority opinion in Suburban Motor Freight relies heavily upon the
arguments made by Members Fanning and Jenkins in their Electronic Re-
production and Collyer47 dissents. Although recognizing that the deferral
policy of Electronic Reproduction was economically praiseworthy and that
relationships, '4 the majority reiterated the argument that the NLRB's primary
concern should be protection of the individual's rights contained in the NLRA.
4'
To justify overruling Electronic Reproduction, the Board borrowed the dichot-
justify overruling Electronic Reproduction, the Board borrowed the dichot-
omy between contractual and individual statutory rights from the Supreme
Court's Gardner-Denver decision. 50 Whereas the majority in Electronic Re-
production said that Gardner-Denver and its rationale were not applicable
outside Title VII discrimination cases,5' the Suburban Motor Freight majority
decided to extend the analogy to the NLRA.5 2 By extending the distinction
to statutory rights cases under the NLRA, the Board could avoid deferral
and could provide employees access to forums in which they could adequately
pursue and protect their rights. The Board declared that it would "no longer
adhere to a doctrine which forces employees to seek simultaneous vindication
of private contractual and public statutory rights, or risk the latter."
5
B. Pre-Arbitral Deferral: Collyer and its Progeny
In Collyer Insulated Wire,54 decided in 1971, the Board made a "quantum
jump" 55 in its deferral policy. The Board's decision to defer, not to an
existing arbitration award, but rather to the arbitration process, created a
preclusion doctrine.5 6 The effect of this extension was to preclude the Board
from hearing an unfair labor practice complaint where the parties had not
exhausted grievance-arbitration remedies contained in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. In Collyer, the union alleged that the employer violated the
good faith bargaining requirement of section 8(a)(5)17 by making unilateral
45. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 147.
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing Collyer).
48. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 147.
49. See NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976); supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 128-139 and accompanying text.
51. Electronic Reproduction, 213 N.L.ILB. at 763-64.
52. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 147.
53. Id. at 146.
54. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
55. Christensen, Private Judges-Public Rights: The Role of Arbitration in the Enforce-
ment of the National Labor Relations Act, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA
60 (1976).
56. Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
57. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides
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adjustments of wage rates. The employer claimed that these adjustments
were authorized by the labor contract and that, in any event, the dispute
should be resolved through the arbitration procedure. Referring to the
congressional preference for private dispute resolution5" and to arbitrators'
special skills in resolving contractual disputes, 9 the Board stated that pre-
arbitral deferral was appropriate where: (1) the dispute arose within the
confines of a long and productive relationship and there was no claim of
anti-union animus, (2) the parties indicated a willingness to arbitrate under
an arbitration clause broad enough to encompass the dispute, and (3) the
contract and its meaning lie at the center of the dispute. 60 Noting that these
conditions existed in the present case, the Board referred the complaint to
arbitration. The Board stated that in pre-arbitral deferral cases it would
retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of ensuring that the dispute was
either settled or submitted to arbitration and that the final arbitration award
was not "repugnant to the Act."
6'
Collyer's implicit principal of compulsory arbitration has provoked much
criticism.62 Member Fanning, in his Collyer dissent, insisted that the decision
would "strip the parties of statutory rights merely on the availability of such
[arbitration] procedure." ' 63 Additionally, Fanning argued that Collyer de-
prived the complaining party of his traditional choice of forum. While the
Spielberg deferral doctrine merely binds a party to his initial choice of
forums, Collyer eliminates a party's initial choice altogether.
4
Despite the criticisms of Collyer, one year later the Board expanded its
pre-arbitral deferral policy in National Radio Co. 65 to include cases involving
section 8(a)(3)6 violations. In National Radio, the complaint alleged that the
employer violated section 8(a)(3) by discharging a union steward for his
failure to comply with a unilaterally instituted rule which required union
stewards to report their movements while handling grievances. Applying the
in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees."Id.
58. See LMRA § 203(d), supra note I.
59. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
60. Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
61. Id. at 843.
62. See Pye, Collyer's Effect on the Individual Charging Party, 25 LAB. L.J. 561, 569
(1974); Johannesen and Smith, Collyer: Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB, L.J. 723, 738-41
(1972); Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 55 (1973).
63. Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 849 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
64. Id. at 847. Spielberg is less compulsory than Collyer. Whereas Spielberg permits the
Board to review existing arbitration decisions for consistency with the Act, Collyer entirely
eliminates the Board as a forum merely because a nonexistent arbitration award could vindicate
the violation of petitioner's statutory rights. Under Spielberg, since the parties chose arbitration
as the initial forum and have invested time and resources in reaching a final decision, there is
every reason to uphold that final arbitration award. No similar justification for pre-arbitral
deferral exists in Collyer. Note, Limiting Deferral under the Spielberg Doctrine, 67 VA. L.R.
615, 617 n.17 (1981).
65. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
66. See supra note 16.
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Collyer policy of pre-arbitral deferral, the Board deferred the section 8(a)(3)
charge to arbitration. Unlike the Collyer decision, however, National Radio
dealt with a dispute over rights that went far beyond mere conflicting
interpretations of collective bargaining agreements. By deferring, the Board
significantly expanded the policy announced in Collyer and permitted arbi-
trators to resolve statutory as well as contractual issues.
The majority acknowledged that it was extending Collyer beyond its
original intended scope of section 8(a)(5) violations, but argued that arbitra-
tors were fully competent to decide discipline cases based upon "just cause"
clauses. 67 Insisting that abstention cannot be equated with abdication, the
majority argued that they were merely "adjuring the parties to seek resolution
of their dispute under the provisions of their own contract and thus fostering
both the collective relationship and the federal policy favoring voluntary
arbitration and dispute settlement.1 6 Members Fanning and Jenkins, in a
vehement dissent, argued that section 8(a)(3) charges were even less suited to
pre-arbitration deferral than section 8(a)(5) charges. 69 Additionally, they
questioned the competence of arbitrators to resolve the statutory issues
involved 70 and cautioned the Board against "subcontracting" public authority
to private tribunals.
7 '
The Board abruptly reversed the liberal pre-arbitral deferral policy of
Collyer and National Radio in 1977 with General American Transportation
Corp.7 2 In General American, the union alleged that the employer violated
67. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. at 531.
68. Id.
69. Id. The National Radio dissent distinguished section 8(a)(3) from section 8(a)(5) by
arguing that:
[S]tatutory protection against discrimination on the job because of engaging in, or
refraining from, union activity is an individual right, unlike the union or group right,
to be protected from unilateral changes in the collective-bargaining agreement. Because
it is granted by statute to individuals, it cannot be reduced altered or displaced by an
agreement between the employer and the union.
Id. (emphasis in original). This is one of the earliest statements of the argument that "individual"
statutory rights, unlike "group" statutory rights, are inappropriate for Board deferral. Cf.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); infra notes 128-139 (discussing Gardner-
Denver).
70. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. at 533 (Members Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting).
The dissent compared the arbitrator's ability to resolve statutory issues with the Board's ability
and stated:
The special competence of arbitrators in contract disputes, which is the only substan-
tive justification the Supreme Court has found for ordering the contracting parties to
arbitrate rather than litigate, does not exist in the field of statutory rights. The
arbitration process cannot use the Board's investigative or legal resources and capa-
bilities, and arbitrators do not have expertise in statutory issues which the Board has
necessarily acquired through long, intimate, and specialized experience.
Id.
71. Id. "To compel the victim of this alleged discrimination to resort to arbitration is not
'deferral,' but a subcontracting to a private tribunal of the determination of rights conferred
and guaranteed solely by the statute." Id.
72. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
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section 8(a)(3) by laying off an employee because of his union activities. The
Board, in affirming the administrative law judge's refusal to defer to
arbitration, overruled National Radio and expressly rejected pre-arbitral
deferral in cases involving section 8(a)(3) violations.
73
General American exposed the sharp division between Board members
regarding the proper deferral policy. Two members supported continued
adherence to the liberal deferral policy announced in National Radio,7 4 while
two other members favored abandoning the Collyer deferral doctrine com-
pletely.75 Chairman Murphy, in her decisive concurrence, assumed a middle
position which limited pre-arbitral deferral to cases where the dispute was
"essentially between contracting parties" and where there was no alleged
interference with the individual's basic section 7 rights. 76 She found that
complaints alleging violations of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)77 fell squarely
within this category. With respect to these cases, Murphy stated that she
would continue to defer to the arbitration process because such disputes
"are eminently suited to the arbitral process, and resolution of the contract
issue by an arbitrator will ... dispose of the unfair labor practice issue." 78
Chairman Murphy refused to defer in cases involving the individual rights
of employees contained in sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2),
however, because arbitration decisions based on the contract would not
dispose of the unfair labor practice issues involved in those cases.79
III. A CHANGE IN COURSE: Olin AND United Technologies
The deferral policies established in Suburban Motor Freight and General
American remained intact until January 1984 when a change of Board
membership caused a change of Board policy.80 The Republican-dominated
Board announced two decisions that significantly expanded the arbitrator's
role in resolving statutory disputes. In Olin Corp.," the Board altered the
standards of deferral and reallocated the burden of proof, thereby allowing
73. Id. at 811 (Chairman Murphy, concurring).
74. See id. at 813-19 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting).
75. See id. at 808-10 (Members Fanning and Jenkins supported complete abandonment
of Collyer doctrine).
76. Id. at 810.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1976). Section 8(b) of the NLRA provides in relevant part: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7... ; (2) to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3)... ; (3)
to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer .. " Id.
78. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 810.
79. Id. at 811.
80. In May 1983 President Reagan appointed Patricia Diaz Dennis to the NLRB. She has
consistently joined Chairman Donald L. Dotson and Robert P. Hunter to form a 3-to-I pro-
management majority to outvote the last remaining Carter appointee, Don A. Zimmerman.
(One seat on the five-member board is vacant.)
81. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
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deferral to existing arbitration awards even in cases where the arbitrators did
not consider the unfair labor practice issue. In the companion case of United
Techologies,82 the Board extended the Collyer deferral doctrine to cases
dealing with individual statutory rights.
Olin Corp. involved the discharge of Salvatore Spatorico, president of
the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, because of his encouragement
of and participation in a "sick ,Ut."1 83 Such behavior contravened a no-strike
clause in the collective-bargaining agreement which prohibited any union
officers from causing a work stoppage.84 The union grieved the discharge
and claimed that by discharging Spatorico while merely reprimanding other
employees who participated in the sick out, Olin discriminated against
Spatorico in violation of section 8(a)(3). s5 The arbitrator found that Spatorico
"at least partially caused or participated" in the sick out and concluded that
"[u]nion officers implicitly have an affirmative duty not to cause strikes
which are in violation of the clause, not to participate in such strikes and to
try to stop them when they occur." ' 86 Accordingly, the arbitrator found that
Spatorico was properly discharged.
The administrative law judge refused to defer to the arbitration decisions
because the arbitrator did not consider the section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice
issue "in any serious way."8s7 On the merits, however, the judge agreed that
the discharge was valid. While an employer, consistent with section 8(a)(3),
cannot unilaterally insist that union officials assume greater obligations than
rank-and-file employees with respect to the enforcement of a no-strike clause,
the judge noted that the union may bargain away the statutory protection
accorded union officials in order to secure valuable concessions for union
members.88 Finding that the no-strike clause was a "clear and unmistakable" 89
82. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
83. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). On December 17, 1980, the Olin Corp.
management suspended two pipefitters for refusing to perform a job that the employees felt
was millwright work. Id. After the management refused to lift the suspensions, a "sick out"
ensued during which 43 employees, including Spatorico, left work with medical excuses. Id.
84. Id. The no-strike clause provided: "During the life of the Agreement ... neither the
Local Union nor the International Union, nor any officer or representative [sic] of either, will
cause or permit its members to cause any strike, slowdown or stoppage (total or partial) of
work or any interference, directly or indirectly with the full operation of the plant." Id. at 576.
85. See supra note 16 (quoting section 8(a)(3)).
86. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 586-87; see Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 1467 (1983). In
Metropolitan Edison, the Supreme Court recently clarified the uncertain area of disparate
punishment of union officials for their participation in wildcat strikes. The Court concluded
that a "union and an employer reasonably could choose to secure the integrity of a no-strike
clause by requiring union officials to take affirmative steps to end unlawful work stoppages."
Id. at 1477. However, such an added burden upon union officials with its implied additional
sanctions, must be clearly inferred "from a general contractual provision that the parties
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waiver of Spatorico's section 8(a)(3) rights, the judge concluded that the
disparate punishment of Spatorico did not violate the anti-discrimination
policy of section 8(a)(3). The judge therefore dismissed the complaint.
The Board majority reaffirmed the decision to dismiss the Olin com-
plaint, not on the merits, but on the ground that deferral to the arbitrator's
award was appropriate under Spielberg.90 The majority used the opportunity
to expand its post-arbitral deferral policy. In revising the Spielberg standards
to "more fully comport with the aims of the Act and American labor
policy," 9' the Olin majority rejected the Raytheon92 requirement that condi-
tioned deferral upon the arbitrator resolving the unfair labor practice issue.
The Olin majority then reallocated the burden of proof as established in
Suburban Motor Freight.93
The Board majority in Olin also criticized its decision in Propoco94 which
expanded the prerequisites for deferral set forth in Raytheon.95 Under
Propoco, the Board or'an Administrative Law Judge would not defer unless
all statutory claims were presented to the arbitrator and the arbitrator fully
considered these claims.96 The standard of deferral set forth in Propoco
severely limited the Board's ability to defer to the decisions and remedies
arising out of private arbitration decisions. 97 As a consequence, the Olin
majority concluded that Propoco "serve[d] only to frustrate the declared
purpose of Spielberg ... [which recognizes] the arbitration process as an
important aspect"98 of federal labor policy. Borrowing from the Propoco
dissent, the majority adopted a new two-part standard and rejected the old
Raytheon requirement. According to the new standard, an arbitrator has
adequately considered the unfair labor practice issue if "(1) the contractual
issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the
arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the
unfair labor practice." 99
An equally significant change of policy came with the Board's realloca-
tion of the burden of proving the deferral requirements. Arguing that
"infrequent deferrals by the Board" under the Suburban Motor Freight
policy demonstrated the need for a different allocation of burdens, the
majority adopted a new standard. Under the new standard the party seeking
to have the Board reject deferral and ignore the arbitrator's decision must
demonstrate that the standards of deferral have not been satisfied.1'0 Thus,
90. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 573; Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
91. Id. at 574.
92. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing Raytheon).
93. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (discussing Suburban Motor Freight).
94. Propoco, Inc., 263 NLRB 136 (1982).
95. See supra note 88.
96. 263 NLRB at 137-38.
97. Olin Corp., 268 NLRB at 574.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. In a footnote the Olin majority denied the dissent's claim that the new standard
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for a party to obtain de novo Board review of an arbitration proceeding, he
has the burden of demonstrating: (1) the Spielberg deferral standards were
not met, (2) the contractual issue is not factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, or (3) the arbitrator was not presented with facts relevant to
resolving the unfair labor practice.1° '
The Olin majority disagreed that its new standard of review of arbitra-
tors' awards and the reallocation of burden of proof "depriv[ed] employees
of their statutory forum."' 0 2 The majority justified these clarifications of
Spielberg as necessary to restrict the "overzealous dissection of [arbitrators']
opinions by the NLRB"'' 3 and to return the Board to a consistent deferral
policy. The majority expressed concern that the Board's failure to defer in
a consistent manner set an improper example for General Counsel and
administrative law judges. 04 Citing six circuit court decisions 0 5 that disagreed
with the Board's refusal to defer as evidence that the Board's past deferral
policy "was not so much policy as it was whim,"' ' 06 the majority declared
its "commitment to a policy of full, consistent, and evenhanded deferrence
... where it meets what we understand to be appropriate safeguards for
statutory rights."' 0 7
Member Zimmerman, in a sharp dissent, rebuked the majority for
overruling Suburban Motor Freight and Propoco'0 8 and argued that the new
post-arbitral deferred standard adopted in Olin was "indistinguishable in
result from the rule of Electronic Reproduction. "109 He charged the majority
with unjustifiably rejecting a judicially approved addition to the original
is a return to the rule of Electronic Reproduction Service. Id. at 575 n.10. The majority stated
that it agrees only with the part of Electronic Reproduction which placed on the General counsel
the burden of demonstrating that the arbitral award was unworthy of deferral. Id. The majority-
emphasized that they did not resurrect that portion of Electronic Reproduction which required
no more than an "opportunity" to present the unfair labor practice issue to the arbitrator to
warrant deferral. Id.
101. Id. at 575; but cf. infra note 103.
102. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 575 n.9.
105. See id. at 575 n.ll, citing Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979),
NLRB v. Pincus Bros., 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980), Liquor Salesmen's Local 2 (Charmer In-
dustries) v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1981), NLRB v. Motor Convoy, 673 F.2d 734 (4th
Cir. 1982), American Freight Systems v. NLRB, 114 LRRM 3513 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Rich-
mond Tank Car Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1983).
106. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 575.
107. Id. at 576.
108. Id. at 577; see Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980); Propoco, Inc., 263
N.L.R.B. 136 Z1982). Although the Olin Corp. majority did not overrule either Suburban Motor
Freight or Propoco, Zimmerman argued to the contrary: "The majority suggests that Suburban
Motor Freight has been overruled only to the extent that it 'provided for a different allocation
of burdens in deferral cases.' I will not indulge my colleagues in the canard that Propoco, Subur-
ban Motor Freight, Yourga and Airco have not been totally overruled, or that Raytheon and
Monsanto have not suffered the same fate." Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 579.
109. Id. at 577; see Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 258 (1974).
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Spielberg doctrine and replacing it with a thoroughly discredited rule." 0
Under the new Olin standard, the Board will defer to an arbitration
award if the contractual and unfair labor practice issues are factually
parallel."' Zimmerman noted that this doctrine of factual parallelism is the
foundation upon which the Electronic Reproduction majority based its
presumption that the resolution of the contract issue necessarily resolved the
unfair labor practice issue." 2 Zimmerman argued that the use of this pre-
sumption to justify deferral amounts to an abdication of the Board's
obligation to protect employees' rights under Section 10(a) of the Act. He
further argued that the new deferral standard is contrary to overwhelming
judicial precedent that the Board has no authority to defer without affirm-
ative proof that the unfair labor practice issue was resolved. 3
The Olin dissent also objected to the "inequity" of the majority's new
burden of proof. Zimmerman supported the Board's previous position
imposing the burden of proof upon the party seeking deferral. He argued
that by shifting the burden of proof, the Board transformed "an affirmative
defense into a part of the General Counsel's prima facie case."" Zimmerman
further objected to the majority's assertion that the reallocation of the
burden was necessitated by the Board's infrequent deferrals under the
Suburban Motor Freight standard. Citing agency statistics to rebut the
majority's assertion, he argued that the Board had deferred to the arbitration
process in the vast majority of cases. 5
Zimmerman questioned the majority's central assumption that an expan-
110. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 579. Zimmerman cited numerous court of appeals cases
that have either expressly or implicitly rejected the Electronic Reproduction rule. Id. at 578 n.5;
see supra note 38 (discussing Stephenson and Banyard).
111. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 579. Zimmerman argued that the new two-step majority
test involves only one step. He reasoned:
If the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, then
how can one possible prove that the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor
practice issue have not been presented to the arbitrator unless one proves the absurdity
that even the facts relevant to the contract issue were not presented?... It will
presume that an arbitrator has considered both contract and unfair labor practice




113. Id. at 579-80; see Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1977) (the
"arbitral tribunal must have clearly decided the unfair labor practice issue on which the Board
is later urged to give deference"); NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806, 811 (6th Cir.
1983) (the court would honor the Board's decision to defer "only when it appears from the
arbitrator's award that the arbitrator considered and clearly decided all unfair labor practice
charges"); United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 972, 981 (3d Cir. 1983) ("for the
Board's deferral policy not to be one of abdication, the Board must be presented with some
evidence that the statutory issue has actually been decided") (quoting NLRB v. General Warehouse
Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1981)), vacated, 464 U.S. 979 (1983); cert. denied, .U.S. ,
105 S.Ct. 126 (1984).
114. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 580.
115. Id. at 581.
DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
sive deferral policy and a reallocation of burden would promote the federal
labor policy favoring dispute resolution through arbitration. He argued that
the Board's deferral policy has reached a point where it actually discourages
arbitration. Noting that arbitration is an attractive way to resolve minor
grievances because it is cheaper, faster and less formal than Board-review,
he warned that forcing parties to resolve disputes in the contractual setting
would impair those attributes that made arbitration attractive. He suggested
that, as the result of the new Board procedures, unions might insist that
arbitration proceedings be conducted under all the formal procedures of a
case before the Board. He concluded: "The final irony of the stress created
by a Board policy of wholesale deferral may be that one or both parties to
collective-bargaining negotiations will oppose the inclusion of any form of
arbitration provision in a contract.""
6
As a final point, Zimmerman maintained that adoption of the broad
deferral rule of Olin was unnecessary in this case to justify deferral to the
arbitration award. Since the arbitrator was clearly presented with and con-
sidered the unfair labor practice issue, he agreed that the judge should have
deferred by applying the proper Suburban Motor Freight standard.'"
In United Technologies, the Board addressed a charge that the employer
had violated section 8(a)(1)" 8 by threatening an employee with disciplinary
action if she persisted in processing a grievance to the second step. At the
administrative law hearing, the employer denied that it had violated section
8(a)(1). Since the dispute was cognizable under the grievance-arbitration
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the employer also urged
that the dispute be deferred to arbitration pursuant to Collyer. The admin-
istrative law judge properly applied the General American Transportation
standard of refusing to defer in individual rights cases, and ultimately found
that the violations had occurred. The Board majority reversed the judge's
decision, expressly overruled General American Transportation, and ordered
that the dispute be deferred to arbitration.
The United Technologies majority opinion offered no new arguments in
support of the Board's decisions to extend the Collyer pre-arbitral deferral
policy to cases involving individual statutory rights. In fact, for the most
part, the majority reiterated the arguments presented by the majority opinion
in Collyer. The opinion emphasized the importance of arbitration in federal
labor law, repeated the congressional intent of section 203(d) that arbitration
is the "desirable method" for dispute resolution and cited the Steelworker's
Trilogy to show that the Supreme Court has consistently "sanction[ed]
arbitration as a preferred instrument for preserving industrial peace."" '9
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 557. Section 8(a)(l) provides in relevant part:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1976).
119. United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 558.
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The majority also presented a history of the Board's deferral policy in
which it emphasized that "the Board has played a key role in fostering a
climate in which arbitration could flourish."'' 20 The opinion praised both the
Collyer decision to defer in section 8(a)(5) cases and the National Radio
decision to defer in section 8(a)(3) cases as promoting the federal policy
favoring arbitration by requiring the parties to resolve labor disputes under
the grievance mechanisms of their own contract. The majority characterized
the General American Transportation decision, however, as an abrupt change
from the sound deferral policies of Collyer and National Radio. Claiming
that the majority's refusal in General American Transportation to defer to
section 8(a)(1) and (3) cases "essentially emasculated the Board's deferral
policy ... for reasons that are largely unsupportable," the majority con-
cluded that the Collyer policy "deserves to be resurrected and infused with
new life.''
2'
The central theme supporting the majority's decision to extend the
Collyer deferral policy to cases involving statutory individual rights was the
oft-repeated argument that parties to a collective bargaining agreement should
be bound by the terms of their contract. The majority argued that:
[I]t is contrary to the basic principles of the Act for the Board to
jump into the fray prior to an honest attempt by the parties to
resolve their disputes .... [T]he statutory purpose of encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining is ill-served by
permitting the parties to ignore their agreement and to petition this
Board in the first instance for remedial relief.
2 2
Although the Board gave greater reign to arbitrators, the majority maintained
that "deferral is not akin to abdication. It is merely the prudent exercise of
restraint .... ,,"2a The majority also pointed out that if the arbitration award
was inconsistent with the standards of Spielberg, the Board's processes could
always be invoked to remedy the abuse.124
Member Zimmerman strongly dissented to the overruling of General
American Transportation and charged that a return to the standard of
National Radio "needlessly sacrifices basic safeguards for individual em-
ployee rights under the Act.' ' 2 Maintaining that former Chairman Murphy's
position in General American Transportation was the correct deferral policy,
Zimmerman argued that the Board should not force parties into arbitration
unless "their unfair labor practice disputes essentially involve the interpre-
tation of a collective-bargaining agreement."'
' 26
120. Id.
121. Id. at 559.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 560.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 561 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
126. Id.
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In rejecting the majority's contention that the universal judicial accept-
ance of the Collyer doctrine also encompasses the overbroad deferral policy
of National Radio, Zimmerman cited strong judicial support in the circuit
courts approving the General American Transportation policy.' 27 While
noting that national labor policy favoring private dispute resolution requires
the judiciary to give broad deference to arbitration in the resolution of
contract issues, he argued that "the Supreme Court has made clear that the
same degree of deference... cannot be applied ... by the Board... where
statutory issues are at stake."' 2 8 Citing the Supreme Court decisions in
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System 29 and Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. 130 in support of the distinction between group contractual and
individual statutory rights, the dissent argued that employees' individual
section 7 rights are "public rights" which the Board "expressly is required
to protect."' 3 '
Zimmerman also rejected the majority's central argument that grievance-
arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements bind individual
employees to arbitration as the only forum of first resort. While acknowl-
edging that a union may agree to waive some individual statutory rights, the
dissent argued that "a union cannot waive an individual employee's right to
choose a statutory forum in which to... litigate an unfair practice issue."''
32
He charged that the majority's deferral policy does not require a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of the statutory right to pursue claims before the
Board, but rather "simply assume[s] that the mere existence of a contractual
grievance and arbitration procedure proves a waiver."' 33
Zimmerman sharply criticized the majority's reassurances that the new
deferral policy of United Technologies is merely an exercise of "prudent
restraint." Pointing out that the arbitration process is not designed to or
adept at protecting employee statutory rights, he argued that the majority's
reliance on the Spielberg "catchall safety net" does not adequately protect
employee statutory rights for several reasons: (1) a union might not vigorously
present an employee's arbitration claim in order to advance the interests of
the union as a whole, (2) the arbitrator may lack the competency necessary
to resolve statutory issues because his specialty is in "the law of the shop,
not the law of the land," and (3) because the arbitrator must decide the
dispute in accordance with the parties' intent expressed in the collective-
bargaining agreement, he may issue a ruling inconsistent with the policies of
127. See id. at 562 n.5, citing NLRB v. Container Corp., 649 F.2d 1213 (6th Cir. 1981),
Jack Thompson Oldsmobile v. NLRB, 684 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1982) and NLRB v. Northeast
Oklahoma City Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1980).
128. 268 N.L.R.B. at 562.
129. See infra notes 140-151 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 137-150 and accompanying text.
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the Act. 34 Additionally, Zimmerman argued that the limited -protection of
employee rights afforded by Spielberg will disappear in the wake of the new
post-arbitral deferral policy announced in Olin Corp. 35
IV. THE SuPREME CouRT: RESTRICTING DEFERRAL
The new policies announced in Olin and United Technologies effectively
foreclose employees from asserting and pursuing individual statutory rights
before the Board. Under present policy, the Collyer doctrine and United
Technologies preclude the Board from entertaining unfair labor practice
charges that are subject to arbitration. Additionally, once a case is arbitrated,
the Board will defer to the arbitrator's decision unless the General Counsel
can prove that the proceedings did not conform with the requirements of
Spielberg and Olin. The result in both cases has been to expand significantly
the jurisdiction of arbitrators; originally restricted to the resolution of
contractual disputes, arbitrators now have authority to decide statutory issues
as well. This has prompted considerable criticism that the Board has abdi-
cated its duty under section 10(a) to protect employees' statutory rights. 36
The propriety of the Board's new deferral policies must be evaluated in
light of the Supreme Court's recent trend toward restricting the authority of
arbitrators to decide statutory issues. The Court has held that in Title VII,
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and section 1983 cases, a prior arbitral
award does not preclude an individual's right to pursue his statutory rights
in a judicial forum. While the applicability of these decisions to other bodies
of law is still unresolved, similarities between the NLRA, Title VII, FLSA
and § 1983 raise serious questions about the Board's current deferral and
preclusion policies.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 37 the Supreme Court determined
the proper role of arbitration in the resolution and enforcement of an
individual's rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 38 Alexander, a
black employee, filed a grievance alleging that he was discharged from
employment for racially discriminatory reasons.139 The grievance was arbi-
trated and the arbitrator, without considering the Title VII issue, ruled that
Alexander had been discharged for cause. Subsequently, Alexander filed a
134. Id. at 563-64.
135. Id. at 564. Zimmerman argued that the Spielberg review will afford individuals no
protection in pre-arbitral Collyer cases if the party seeking deferral need not prove that the
unfair labor practice issue has been presented to and considered by the arbitrator. Id.
136. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 579 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
137. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act).
139. 415 U.S. at 42. Alexander filed the grievance through his union representative of
Local 3029 of the United Steelworkers of America, pursuant to the grievance arbitration clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 39. The grievance stated: "I feel I have been
unjustly discharged and ask that I be reinstated with full seniority and pay." Id. No claim
based upon racial discrimination was raised until the final prearbitration step of the grievance
procedure. Id. at 42.
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Title VII action in federal district court, but it was dismissed on the grounds
that his discrimination claim previously had been submitted to arbitration .
40
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that an employee's
statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII was not foreclosed by a
prior submission to binding arbitration of a grievance based upon the same
discrimination claim.
In Gardner-Denver, the Court recognized that employees have two
separate and distinct rights that protect them against employer discrimination:
contractual rights which arise from the nondiscrimination clause in the
collective-bargaining agreement, and statutory rights which are independent
of the contract.' 4' Each of the rights provides a separate cause of action and
the decision to enforce one action does not preclude vindication of the other.
The Court explained that "[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual
and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as the
result of the same factual occurrence .... No inconsistency results from
permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate for-
ums." 142
The Court relied upon this dichotomy between statutory and contractual
rights to reverse the district court's holding that submission of a grievance
to arbitration precludes subsequent consideration of the claim in court.'
4
Additionally, the Court rejected the employer's contention that even if a
preclusion rule is not adopted, federal courts should defer to arbitral decisions
of discrimination claims.'"4 Noting the obvious analogy to the Board's
deferral policy in Spielberg, the Court refused such a rule because it would
"deprive the petitioner of his statutory right to attempt to establish his claim
in federal court."'"4
The Court declined to extend the Spielberg deferral policy to Title VII
cases because arbitration is an inappropriate forum for final resolution of
Title VII rights. A review of the characteristics and limitations of arbitration
provided ample support for that conclusion. First, the Court noted that since
the specialized competency of arbitrators pertains to the law of the shop,
many arbitrators have insufficient knowledge and skill to resolve the consti-
tutional or statutory questions involved in Title VII cases.' 46 Even if the
140. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
141. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 49-50.
142. Id. at 50.
143. See id. at 49, 51, 54.
144. See id. at 55-56. The employer suggested that the requirements for deferral should
be: "(i) the claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited
the form of discrimination charged in the suit under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has the
authority to rule on the claim and to fashion a remedy." Id.
145. Id. at 56.
146. Id. at 57. The Supreme Court's opinion made a subtle but important change in its
view of the arbitrator's expertise. Historically, arbitrators were viewed as particularly competent
in effectuating industrial peace. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.). However, the Gardner-Denver decision
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arbitrator is competent, however, he must still effectuate the intent of the
parties rather than enforce the statute.' 47 Secondly, since arbitration proceed-
ings do not have the same procedural safeguards as courts, the court
considered federal courts a more appropriate forum for resolution of Title
VII issues. 48 Finally, the Court expressed concern that because the union
has exclusive control over the presentation of grievances, the rights of
individual union members may be sacrificed to benefit the union as a whole.
49
The Court concluded that the conflict between the federal policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory
employment practices could be best accommodated by permitting an em-
ployee to pursue both his contractual remedy in the arbitral forum and his
statutory remedy under Title VII. Thus, the federal courts were directed to
hear an employee's Title VII claim de novo with evidence of the arbitration
award "accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate."' 5 0
In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc.,"'' the Supreme
Court extended the holding and rationale of Gardner-Denver to disputes
arising under the FLSA. Barrentine, a company truck driver, filed a grievance
claiming that truck drivers were entitled to compensation for time spent
conducting pre-trip inspections of their trucks and transporting trucks to the
repair facility. After the grievance committee rejected the grievance without
explanation, Barrentine brought suit in federal district court alleging that the
clarified the limitations of the arbitrator. The ramifications of the Court's clarification are
twofold: (1) it casts doubt on an arbitrator's ability to resolve labor-management conflicts
alleging employment discrimination, and (2) it opens the door to court review of the arbitrator's
decision when evaluating its admissibility as evidence in Title VII litigation. Siber, The Gardner-
Denver Decision: Does It Put Arbitration in a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708, 711 (1974).
147. 415 U.S. at 57. In Gardner-Denver, the Court stated:
The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict
with the bargain between the parties .... If an arbitral decision is based "solely
upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation," rather than
on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has "ex-
ceeded the scope of the submission," and the award will not be enforced.
Id. at 53 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960)).
148. Id. at 57-58. The Court noted that arbitration does not provide procedural safeguards
such as a complete record, application of evidence rules, discovery, compulsory process, cross-
examination and testimony under oath. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized
that "[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the court to given reasons for an award." Id. at 58
(quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960)).
149. Id. at 58 n.19.
150. Id. at 60. The Court adopted no standards concerning the weight to be accorded an
arbitral award in a de novo proceeding, but did indicate that relevant factors include: the
existence of racial discrimination provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform
substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness, adequacy of the record on the
Title VII issue, and the special competence of the arbitrator. Id. at 60 n.21. The Court stated
that where the arbitrator has fully considered the Title VII claim, the trial court can give great
weight to the arbitrator's award. Id.
151. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
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employer's failure to pay employees "for all time spent in the service of the
Employer" 5 2 violated section 6(a) of the FLSA. 53 The complaint also alleged
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by entering into
a "side deal" with the employer concerning compensation for inspection and
transportation time. The District Court rejected the union's fair representa-
tion claim and allowed the grievance committee's decision to stand.15 4 The
Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the employees' voluntary sub-
mission of their grievances to arbitration foreclosed a subsequent court
action to assert the same claim. 55 The Supreme Court reversed.
As in Gardner-Denver, the Court in Barrentine furthered the distinction
between grievances arising out of collective bargaining agreements and
grievances based upon statutory rights. Rejecting the employer's contention
that the national labor policy favoring the collective bargaining process
mandated the courts to defer to an arbitral determination of the wage claim,
the Court stated:
Not all disputes between an employee and his employer are suited
for binding resolution in accordance with the procedures established
by collective bargaining. While courts should defer to an arbitral
decision where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out
of the collective-bargaining agreement, different considerations apply
where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers. 1
56
Noting that the purpose of FLSA is to protect workers from "substandard
wages and oppressive working hours,"' 5 7 that the Act's statutory enforcement
scheme grants individual employees broad access to the courts, 58 and that
employees' rights under the Act are nonwaivable,'5 9 the Court concluded that
FLSA rights are best protected in a judicial rather than an arbitral forum.
The Court gave two reasons, similar to those in Gardner-Denver, to
support its decision not to adopt a foreclosure rule. First, a union may
152. Id. at 731. Article 50 of the collective-bargaining agreement between Arkansas-Best
and Barrentine's union (Local 878 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers) provided: "All employees covered by this Agreement shall be
paid for all time spent in the service of the Employer. Rates of pay provided for by this
Agreement shall be minimums. Time shall be computed from the time that the employee is
ordered to report for work and registers in until the time he is effectively released from duty.
Such payment for employee's time shall be at the hourly rate." Id. at 731 n.3.
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976) (section 6(a) of FLSA).
154. 475 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
155. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1980).
156. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737.
157. Id. at 739.
158. Id. at 740. Section 16(b) of FLSA permits an aggrieved employee to bring his statutory
wage and hour claim "in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1976).
159. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745.
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decide not to support vigorously an employee's meritorious wage claim in
order to maximize the overall compensation of union members.'60 Second,
statutory rights may go unvindicated because the arbitrator is not competent
to interpret the FLSA; even if an arbitrator is competent, however, he is still
required to effectuate the intent of the parties as expressed in the collective
bargaining agreement.' 6' The Court added a final reason not mentioned in
Gardner-Denver, that the arbitrator is often powerless to award the aggrieved
employee the types of relief that a court could grant.
62
The Court concluded by reiterating that individual statutory rights are
independent of the collective bargaining process. Maintaining that the courts
have a duty to protect the congressionally granted FLSA rights, the Court
held that an employee cannot be precluded from pursuing his statutory




Recently in McDonald v. City of West Branch64 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the holdings of Gardner-Denver and Barrentine by refusing to
give preclusive effect to an arbitration award in a subsequent section 1983
civil rights action. 65 McDonald, a police officer and union steward, was
discharged, allegedly for sexual harrassment. Pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement, McDonald filed a grievance contending that there was
"no proper cause" for his discharge. After exhausting the preliminary
grievance-reduction steps, the grievance was taken to arbitration where the
arbitrator ruled against McDonald. McDonald did not appeal the arbitrator's
decision; instead he filed a section 1983 suit against the City of West Branch.
160. Id. at 742.
161. Id. at 743-44.
162. Id. at 745.
163. Id. Accord, Castle and Lansing, Arbitration of Labor Grievances Brought Under
Contractual and Statutory Provisions: The Supreme Court Grows Less Deferential to the
Arbitration Process, 21 Am. Bus. L.J. 49, 88 (1983). Castle and Lansing note that while the
holding of Barrentine appears consistent with the general thrust of the FLSA, it is not dictated
by any express statutory language. Castle and Lansing suggest that Congress modify the FLSA
to allow courts to defer to arbitration awards (and avoid subsequent litigation) when the
following requirements are met: (1) the contract right coincides with the FLSA right; (2) the
arbitrator's decision does not violate the private rights created by FLSA; (3) the factual issues
before the court are identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (4) the contract authorized the
arbitrator to decide FLSA claims; (5) the arbitrator's decision explains the resolution of the
FLSA claim; and (6) the arbitration proceeding was fair and allowed all facts and arguments
to be presented. Id. at 88.
164. - U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
165. Id. at 1804. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1984).
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In his complaint McDonald alleged that he was discharged for exercising his
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and
freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances. McDonald
won in the district court, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.66
Reasoning that the parties had agreed to settle their disputes through the
arbitration process and that the arbitrator had considered the reasons for
the discharge, the Court of Appeals concluded that res judicata and collateral
estoppel barred McDonald's First Amendment claims. 67 The Supreme Court
reversed.
The Court first rejected the City's contention that the Federal Full Faith
and Credit Statute (section 1738)168 requires courts to give preclusive effect
to arbitration awards. The Court stated that "[airbitration awards are not
... subject to the mandate of section 1738." 169 This conclusion, Justice
Brennan explained, follows from the plain language of section 1738 which
guarantees full faith and credit only to judicial proceedings. Since arbitration
is not a judicial proceeding, section 1738 does not apply to arbitration
awards.
The Court also found the judicially fashioned doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel to be inapplicable in section 1983 actions. Noting that
both Gardner-Denver and Barrentine had rejected the contention that arbi-
tration awards should preclude subsequent suits in federal court, 70 the Court
refused to adopt an arbitration preclusion rule. Although the Court recog-
nized that arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes,
Barrentine and Gardner-Denver compel the conclusion that [arbitra-
tion] cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding
166. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Nos. 81-1420, -1442, -1707, -1805, slip op. at 1-2
(6th Cir. Apr. 19, 1983).
167. 104 S. Ct. at 1801. The Supreme Court defined the term "res judicata" as the "effect
of a judgment on the merits in barring a subsequent suit between the same parties or their
privies that is based upon the same claim." Id. at 1801 n.5. "Collateral estopped," by contract,
provides that "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that
decision may preclude relitigation of that issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving
a party to the first case." Id. (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). The Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute (section 1738) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the
court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
Id.
169. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. at 1802 (quoting Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Co., 456 U.S. 461, 477 (1982)).
170. Id. at 1802-03.
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in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that
section 1983 is designed to safeguard ... [A]ccording preclusive
effect to an arbitration award in a subsequent section 1983 action
would undermine that statute's efficacy in protecting federal rights . 7'
The Court based its conclusion upon four familiar arguments previously
set forth in the Gardner-Denver and Barrentine opinions. First, since an
arbitrator's expertise "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law
of the land," an arbitrator may not have the expertise required to resolve
the complex legal questions that arise in section 1983 actions. Second, an
arbitrator may not have the authority to enforce section 1983 because an
arbitrator's authority derives solely from the collective bargaining agreement.
Third, since the union has exclusive control over the manner and extent to
which an individual grievance is presented, the risk exists that an employee's
rights could be sacrificed for the benefit of the union. Finally, arbitral
factfinding generally is not equivalent to judicial factfinding.' 72 Concluding
that an arbitration proceeding is not an adequate substitute for a judicial
trial and that according preclusive effect to arbitration awards in section
1983 actions would severely undermine the statute's purpose, the Court held
that federal courts should not give res judicata or collateral estoppel effect
to arbitration awards in section 1983 cases.
73
V. CONCLUSION
In Title VII, Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and section 1983 cases,
the Supreme Court has held that arbitration does not foreclose an individual's
right to pursue his statutory rights in a judicial forum. The reasons and
arguments supporting these holdings apply with equal force to individual
statutory rights cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act.
According to the Court's analysis in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine,
statutory rights of employees are separate from and may be asserted in-
dependently of any contractual rights arising under the collective bargaining
agreement. Since each right grants the employee a distinct cause of action,
employees are not precluded from asserting their statutory rights before the
Board because of a prior arbitral award. 7 Recently, in McDonald, the Court
171. Id. at 1803.
172. Id. at 1803-04.
173. Id. at 1804.
173. See supra notes 136-138, 148-150, 159 and accompanying text. The principle arguments
against deferral apply with equal force to individual rights cases under the NLRA: (1) an
arbitrator may not have the expertise required to resolve the complex legal issues that arise in
certain NLRA cases, (2) the arbitrator must enforce the agreement even if it conflicts with
statutory law, (3) since the union has exclusive control over the presentation of the grievance,
the individual's rights may be sacrificed to benefit the union, and (4) arbitral factfinding is
generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding. Id.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43 and 156. The dichotomy between individual
statutory and contractual rights is based primarily upon a recognition that individuals play a
significant role in the enforcement and vindication of important congressional policies. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 45. In Gardner-Denver, the court stated, "[T]he private
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reaffirmed this position by refusing to accord a prior arbitral award res judicata
or collateral estoppel effect in a section 1983 action.'" Because the NLRA
also provides employees rights both as individuals and as members of the col-
lective bargaining unit," Gardner-Denver, Barrentine and McDonald are ap-
posite. The reasons the Court advanced in these cases against a deferral or
preclusion policy are equally applicable to individual rights cases in the NLRA
arena.'
Finally, the decisions in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine and McDonald make
clear that Congress intended the federal courts to bear final responsibility for
the enforcement of important congressional objectives and for the redress of
violations of individuals' statutory rights.'" Since the NLRA, like Title VII,
FLSA, and section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, provides for a federal forum
in which to protect congressionally granted rights,'"7 arbitration should not
foreclose, by deferral or preclusion, an employee from asserting his individual
statutory rights under the NLRA in the forum Congress created."
right of action remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII .... In
such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own injury, but also vindicates the important
congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices." Id.
175. See McDonald, 104 S. Ct. at 1804.
176. See, e.g., NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(1976) (protecting individual's right
to engage in or refrain from union activity); NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1976) (pro-
hibiting employer from refusing to bargain with employees' representatives); see also General
American Transportation Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 810 (Chairman Murphy, concurring); supra
text accompanying notes 76-79.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 147-149, 160-162 and 171. The principal arguments
against deferral apply with equal force to individual rights cases under the NLRA: (1) an ar-
bitrator may not have the expertise required to resolve the complex legal issues that arise in cei-
tain NLRA cases, (2) the arbitrator must enforce the agreement even if it conflicts with statutory
law, (3) since the union has exclusive control over the presentation of the grievance, the individual's
rights may be sacrificed to benefit the union, and (4) arbitral factfinding is generally not equivalent
to judicial factfinding. Id.
178. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 44 ("final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII
is vested with federal courts."); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740 (statutory enforcement scheme of
FLSA "permits an aggrieved employee to bring his statutory wage and hour claim 'in any Federal
or State court of competent jurisdiction.' [quoting FLSA § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b)] .... [N]o
other forum for enforcement of statutory rights is referred to or created by the statute."); McDonald,
104 S. Ct. at 1803. In McDonald, the Court stated, "Because § 1983 creates a course of action,
there is, of course, no question that Congress intended it to be judicially enforceable.. .'The
very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under the color of state law.' " (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
179. Even though cases arising under the NLRB are not given a judicial hearing before a
court of law (as provided in Title VII, FLSA and section 1983 actions), litigants in NLRA actions
are entitled to access to a federal forum which provides many of the same procedural safeguards
as the judicial system. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) (NLRA plaintiff may appeal decision of ad-
ministrative law judge first to Board and then to Circuit Court of Appeals); 29 C.F.R. § 102.45
(1981) (administrative law hearing is conducted according to Federal Rules of Evidence and in-
cludes preparation of complete transcript of proceedings). Arbitration hearings, on the other hand,
lack most of the procedural safeguards and evidentiary procedures of the courts. See Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58.
180. No language in the NLRA implies that private dispute resolution (arbitration) is pro-
per. The Act empowers and obligates the Board to prevent unfair labor practices by enforcing
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The position taken by Chairman Murphy in General American Trans-
portation that permitted Board deferral in cases dealing with contractual
issues, but not in cases involving individual employee rights, is consistent
with the Court's views announced in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine and
McDonald. The new NLRB deferral policies presented by Olin and United
Technologies, however, cannot be reconciled with the Court's position. In
spite of the Court's retrenchment, the Board has expanded its deferral policy
making it nearly impossible for an employee to present his individual rights
case before the Board. In light of the Supreme Court's recent pronounce-
ments, the Board should reconsider its deferral policyin individual rights
cases to ensure that employees' statutory rights are adequately protected.
employees' statutory rights through the established procedure (administrative law hearing with
Board review). 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). Reliance upon LMRA § 203(d) to justify deferral to
arbitration in individual rights cases is misplaced because the language requiring "Final adjust-
ment by a method agreed upon by the parties" suggests that only those parties who agreed to
arbitration (or other method of final adjustment)-namely the union and the employer-should
be bound. See supra note I (quoting section 203(d) of LMRA).
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